Sleeping Beauty problem

E679749

The Sleeping Beauty problem is a famous philosophical and probabilistic puzzle about self-locating belief, asking how an agent should update their credences when they are uncertain about both outcomes and their own temporal location.

All labels observed (2)

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Statements (56)

Predicate Object
instanceOf philosophical puzzle ⓘ
probability puzzle ⓘ
self-locating belief problem ⓘ
thought experiment ⓘ
associatedWith Adam Elga ⓘ
Bas van Fraassen ⓘ
Brian Weatherson ⓘ
David Lewis ⓘ
Ilan Meirav ⓘ
Nick Bostrom ⓘ
debateFocus Dutch book arguments against thirders ⓘ
compatibility of thirder position with reflection principle ⓘ
diachronic Dutch book arguments against halfers ⓘ
how to treat indexical information in Bayesian updating ⓘ
whether Beauty should condition on being awake ⓘ
whether awakenings should be treated as separate evidence instances ⓘ
field Bayesian epistemology ⓘ
decision theory ⓘ
epistemology ⓘ
formal epistemology ⓘ
philosophy of mind ⓘ
philosophy of probability ⓘ
halferPositionClaim Beauty's credence in heads upon awakening should be 1/2 ⓘ
hasSetupElement Beauty does not know which day it is upon awakening ⓘ
Beauty is asked for her credence that the coin landed heads ⓘ
Beauty knows the experimental protocol in advance ⓘ
additional awakening on Tuesday if the coin lands tails ⓘ
awakening on Monday regardless of coin outcome ⓘ
fair coin toss on Sunday ⓘ
memory erasure between awakenings ⓘ
no additional awakening on Tuesday if the coin lands heads ⓘ
involvesConcept Bayesian updating ⓘ
anthropic reasoning ⓘ
centered worlds ⓘ
conditionalization ⓘ
de se belief ⓘ
diachronic rationality ⓘ
evidential selection effects ⓘ
imprecise probabilities ⓘ
indexical information ⓘ
reflection principle ⓘ
self-locating belief ⓘ
self-locating evidence ⓘ
mainQuestion What credence should Sleeping Beauty assign to the proposition that a fair coin landed heads upon awakening? ⓘ
notablePublication Adam Elga's 2000 paper "Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem" ⓘ
David Lewis's 2001 paper "Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga" ⓘ
relatedProblem Doomsday argument ⓘ
linked to: anthropic principle

Monty Hall problem ⓘ
anthropic principle ⓘ
duplication thought experiments ⓘ
reflection paradoxes ⓘ
self-indication assumption ⓘ
self-sampling assumption ⓘ
standardAnswer halfer position ⓘ
thirder position ⓘ
thirderPositionClaim Beauty's credence in heads upon awakening should be 1/3 ⓘ

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (3)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Sleeping Beauty problem → notablePublication → Adam Elga's 2000 paper "Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem" ⓘ
linked to: Sleeping Beauty problem