The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
E840032
"The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" is a seminal economics paper by Oliver Hart (with co-authors) that develops the property-rights approach to the firm, explaining how ownership and control of assets shape optimal firm boundaries and integration decisions.
All labels observed (2)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration canonical | 1 |
| property rights theory of the firm | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T10099030 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Context triple: [Oliver Hart, notableWork, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration]
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A.
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications is a seminal 1975 book in transaction cost economics that examines how firms and markets are structured and the implications of these organizational forms for antitrust policy.
-
B.
"The Nature of the Firm"
"The Nature of the Firm" is a foundational 1937 economic essay by Ronald Coase that explains why firms exist and how transaction costs shape their size and structure.
-
C.
The Theory of Industrial Organization
The Theory of Industrial Organization is a foundational economics textbook by Jean Tirole that systematically develops modern industrial organization theory using game-theoretic tools.
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D.
Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control
"Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control" is an early 20th-century investigative study by the U.S. Bureau of Corporations analyzing how financial structures and ownership patterns influence corporate power and control.
-
E.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Target entity description: "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" is a seminal economics paper by Oliver Hart (with co-authors) that develops the property-rights approach to the firm, explaining how ownership and control of assets shape optimal firm boundaries and integration decisions.
-
A.
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications is a seminal 1975 book in transaction cost economics that examines how firms and markets are structured and the implications of these organizational forms for antitrust policy.
-
B.
"The Nature of the Firm"
"The Nature of the Firm" is a foundational 1937 economic essay by Ronald Coase that explains why firms exist and how transaction costs shape their size and structure.
-
C.
The Theory of Industrial Organization
The Theory of Industrial Organization is a foundational economics textbook by Jean Tirole that systematically develops modern industrial organization theory using game-theoretic tools.
-
D.
Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control
"Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control" is an early 20th-century investigative study by the U.S. Bureau of Corporations analyzing how financial structures and ownership patterns influence corporate power and control.
-
E.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (44)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic article
ⓘ
economics paper ⓘ |
| addresses |
allocation of control in firms
ⓘ
make-or-buy decisions ⓘ trade-off between integration and non-integration ⓘ |
| assumes |
contracts are incomplete
ⓘ
parties cannot specify all future contingencies in contracts ⓘ |
| author | Oliver Hart ⓘ |
| coAuthor | Sanford J. Grossman ⓘ |
| contribution |
derives conditions under which integration is optimal
ⓘ
formalizes the property-rights theory of the firm ⓘ links asset ownership to ex post bargaining outcomes ⓘ |
| coreConcept |
firm boundaries
ⓘ
incomplete contracts ⓘ investment incentives ⓘ lateral integration ⓘ ownership of assets ⓘ residual control rights ⓘ vertical integration ⓘ |
| explains |
determinants of optimal lateral integration
ⓘ
determinants of optimal vertical integration ⓘ how allocation of asset ownership affects bargaining power ⓘ how ownership structure affects ex ante investment incentives ⓘ |
| field |
contract theory
ⓘ
economics ⓘ organizational economics ⓘ theory of the firm ⓘ |
| framework | incomplete contracting model ⓘ |
| influenced |
corporate governance research
ⓘ
industrial organization ⓘ law and economics ⓘ modern theory of the firm ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| proposes | firms should own assets when ownership improves investment incentives more than it worsens counterparties’ incentives ⓘ |
| recognizedAs |
foundational work in property-rights theory
ⓘ
seminal paper in organizational economics ⓘ |
| relatedTo | Grossman–Hart–Moore property-rights framework ⓘ |
| shows |
integration can reduce hold-up problems for some parties
ⓘ
integration can weaken investment incentives of non-owning parties ⓘ ownership matters when investments are relationship-specific ⓘ |
| theoreticalApproach | property-rights approach ⓘ |
| usedIn |
analysis of firm boundaries in supply chains
ⓘ
analysis of vertical mergers ⓘ studies of public versus private ownership of assets ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
The pipeline generated the facts above by prompting gpt-5.1 with this entity's name + description and the instruction below.
Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration Description of subject: "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" is a seminal economics paper by Oliver Hart (with co-authors) that develops the property-rights approach to the firm, explaining how ownership and control of assets shape optimal firm boundaries and integration decisions.
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
Oliver Hart
→
notableWork
→
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
ⓘ
linked to: The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration