Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
E840030
Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm is a foundational work in organizational and contract theory that analyzes how incomplete contracts shape firm boundaries, ownership structures, and incentives.
All labels observed (2)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Grossman–Hart–Moore property-rights framework | 1 |
| Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T10099028 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm Context triple: [Oliver Hart, notableWork, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm]
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A.
"The Nature of the Firm"
"The Nature of the Firm" is a foundational 1937 economic essay by Ronald Coase that explains why firms exist and how transaction costs shape their size and structure.
-
B.
The Theory of Industrial Organization
The Theory of Industrial Organization is a foundational economics textbook by Jean Tirole that systematically develops modern industrial organization theory using game-theoretic tools.
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C.
The Theory of Contracts
The Theory of Contracts is a foundational work in contract theory and economics that analyzes how optimal contracts can be designed under conditions of asymmetric information and incentive problems.
-
D.
Studies in Economic Theory of Decision and Organization
Studies in Economic Theory of Decision and Organization is a seminal collection of Jacob Marschak’s contributions to decision theory and the economics of organizations, emphasizing formal analysis of choice under uncertainty and information.
-
E.
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications is a seminal 1975 book in transaction cost economics that examines how firms and markets are structured and the implications of these organizational forms for antitrust policy.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm Target entity description: Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm is a foundational work in organizational and contract theory that analyzes how incomplete contracts shape firm boundaries, ownership structures, and incentives.
-
A.
"The Nature of the Firm"
"The Nature of the Firm" is a foundational 1937 economic essay by Ronald Coase that explains why firms exist and how transaction costs shape their size and structure.
-
B.
The Theory of Industrial Organization
The Theory of Industrial Organization is a foundational economics textbook by Jean Tirole that systematically develops modern industrial organization theory using game-theoretic tools.
-
C.
The Theory of Contracts
The Theory of Contracts is a foundational work in contract theory and economics that analyzes how optimal contracts can be designed under conditions of asymmetric information and incentive problems.
-
D.
Studies in Economic Theory of Decision and Organization
Studies in Economic Theory of Decision and Organization is a seminal collection of Jacob Marschak’s contributions to decision theory and the economics of organizations, emphasizing formal analysis of choice under uncertainty and information.
-
E.
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications is a seminal 1975 book in transaction cost economics that examines how firms and markets are structured and the implications of these organizational forms for antitrust policy.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic paper
ⓘ
economic theory article ⓘ |
| addresses |
allocation of control in organizations
ⓘ
boundaries between firms and markets ⓘ limits of complete contingent contracts ⓘ why firms own assets rather than contract over them ⓘ |
| analyzes |
how incomplete contracts shape firm boundaries
ⓘ
how ownership allocation affects incentives ⓘ trade-offs between market transactions and integration ⓘ |
| appliesTo |
corporate ownership decisions
ⓘ
design of long-term relationships ⓘ organizational boundary decisions ⓘ vertical integration choices ⓘ |
| contributesTo |
modern theory of the firm
ⓘ
organizational design theory ⓘ property-rights theory of the firm ⓘ |
| emphasizes |
impact of contractual incompleteness on organizational form
ⓘ
importance of residual control rights ⓘ role of asset ownership in providing incentives ⓘ |
| field |
contract theory
ⓘ
law and economics ⓘ organizational economics ⓘ theory of the firm ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
asset ownership
ⓘ
firm boundaries ⓘ hold-up problem ⓘ incentive structures ⓘ incomplete contracts ⓘ ownership structures ⓘ residual control rights ⓘ vertical integration ⓘ |
| influenced |
corporate governance theory
ⓘ
law and economics of contracts ⓘ organizational economics literature ⓘ subsequent research on firm boundaries ⓘ |
| provides |
formal framework for analyzing integration decisions
ⓘ
formal framework for analyzing ownership allocation ⓘ microeconomic foundation for the theory of the firm ⓘ |
| recognizedAs |
foundational work in contract theory
ⓘ
foundational work in organizational economics ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
incomplete contracting literature
ⓘ
property-rights approach to the firm ⓘ transaction cost economics ⓘ |
| usesConcept |
bargaining power
ⓘ
ex post renegotiation ⓘ incomplete contracting ⓘ relationship-specific investments ⓘ residual rights of control ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
The pipeline generated the facts above by prompting gpt-5.1 with this entity's name + description and the instruction below.
Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm Description of subject: Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm is a foundational work in organizational and contract theory that analyzes how incomplete contracts shape firm boundaries, ownership structures, and incentives.
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
→
relatedTo
→
Grossman–Hart–Moore property-rights framework
ⓘ
linked to: Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm