Gale’s example in stable matching with couples

E612751

Gale’s example in stable matching with couples is a classic counterexample in matching theory that demonstrates how allowing couples to participate can cause stable matchings to fail to exist.

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Predicate Object
instanceOf counterexample in matching theory ⓘ
example in stable matching theory ⓘ
non-existence example ⓘ
assumes couples have joint preferences over pairs of positions ⓘ
hospitals or positions have preferences over individual doctors ⓘ
participants include single agents and at least one couple ⓘ
citedIn literature on two-sided matching with complementarities ⓘ
papers on NP-completeness of stable matchings with couples ⓘ
conclusion no assignment is stable under the usual blocking pair definition ⓘ
contrastsWith classical stable marriage problem without couples ⓘ
demonstrates instability introduced by joint preferences of couples ⓘ
limitations of extending Gale–Shapley algorithm to couples ⓘ
non-existence of stable matchings when couples are allowed ⓘ
field algorithmic game theory ⓘ
economics ⓘ
market design ⓘ
matching theory ⓘ
theoretical computer science ⓘ
formalProperty every feasible matching is blocked by some pair or couple ⓘ
historicalRole early example highlighting difficulties of couples in centralized matching ⓘ
implies Gale–Shapley algorithm cannot always find a stable matching with couples ⓘ
involvesConcept blocking couple ⓘ
blocking pair ⓘ
complementarities in preferences ⓘ
joint preferences ⓘ
stability in two-sided markets ⓘ
motivates complexity results for matching with couples ⓘ
search for alternative matching mechanisms ⓘ
search for weaker stability concepts ⓘ
namedAfter David Gale ⓘ
relatedTo Gale–Shapley algorithm ⓘ
hospital–residents problem with couples ⓘ
matching with couples ⓘ
stable marriage problem ⓘ
stable matching problem ⓘ
shows that a stable matching need not exist in the presence of couples ⓘ
that standard stability notions can be incompatible with couples’ preferences ⓘ
teaches that complementarities can destroy existence of stable outcomes ⓘ
usedIn analysis of NRMP (National Resident Matching Program) ⓘ
design of matching algorithms with couples ⓘ
research on hospital–residents matching with couples ⓘ
teaching of stable matching theory ⓘ

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Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

David Gale → notableWork → Gale’s example in stable matching with couples ⓘ
Gale’s example in stable matching with couples → implies → Gale–Shapley algorithm cannot always find a stable matching with couples ⓘ
linked to: Gale’s example in stable matching with couples