Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank

E590646

Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank is a 1994 U.S. Supreme Court decision that held there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting under the federal securities fraud provisions, significantly limiting secondary liability in securities litigation.

All labels observed (3)

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Statements (47)

Predicate Object
instanceOf United States Supreme Court case ⓘ
securities law case ⓘ
branchOfLaw United States corporate and securities law ⓘ
citation 511 U.S. 164 ⓘ
citationStyle Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ⓘ
citedFor Narrow interpretation of implied private rights of action in federal statutes ⓘ
Proposition that aiding-and-abetting liability is not available to private plaintiffs under Section 10(b) ⓘ
country United States ⓘ
court Supreme Court of the United States ⓘ
decisionDate 1994 ⓘ
decisionType 5–4 decision ⓘ
dissentingJustices David H. Souter ⓘ
Harry A. Blackmun ⓘ
John Paul Stevens ⓘ
Ruth Bader Ginsburg ⓘ
effect Eliminated private aiding-and-abetting claims under federal securities fraud provisions ⓘ
Prompted increased attention to state-law aiding-and-abetting theories ⓘ
Shifted focus of securities fraud litigation to primary violators ⓘ
Significantly limited secondary liability in private securities litigation ⓘ
holding Liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to primary violators ⓘ
Private plaintiffs cannot sue secondary actors solely for aiding and abetting securities fraud under federal law ⓘ
There is no private right of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ⓘ
impactOnPractice Reduced exposure of secondary actors such as banks, lawyers, and accountants to private federal securities fraud suits ⓘ
issue Whether private plaintiffs may maintain an aiding-and-abetting action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 ⓘ
jurisdiction United States federal law ⓘ
languageOfDecision English ⓘ
legalArea civil liability ⓘ
federal securities law ⓘ
securities fraud ⓘ
majorityJustices Anthony M. Kennedy ⓘ
Antonin Scalia ⓘ
Clarence Thomas ⓘ
Sandra Day O’Connor ⓘ
William H. Rehnquist ⓘ
majorityOpinionBy Justice Anthony M. Kennedy ⓘ
linked to: Anthony M. Kennedy
overruledOrLimited Limited prior lower-court precedents recognizing aiding-and-abetting liability under Rule 10b-5 ⓘ
petitioner Central Bank of Denver, N.A. ⓘ
reasoning Congress did not expressly create a private right of action for aiding and abetting in the text of Section 10(b) ⓘ
Judicially implied causes of action should not be extended beyond the statute’s text and structure ⓘ
recognizedAs leading case on the scope of private liability under Rule 10b-5 ⓘ
respondent First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ⓘ
ruleInterpreted SEC Rule 10b-5 ⓘ
linked to: Rule 10b-5
statuteInterpreted Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ⓘ
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ⓘ
subsequentDevelopment Congress later addressed aiding-and-abetting liability for the SEC in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ⓘ
yearArgued 1993 ⓘ
yearDecided 1994 ⓘ

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Referenced by (4)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 → relatedCaseLaw → Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank ⓘ
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder → subsequentCitationBy → Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ⓘ
linked to: Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank → citationStyle → Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ⓘ
linked to: Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta → relatedCase → Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver ⓘ
linked to: Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank