Prêt à Voter

E487737

Prêt à Voter is an end-to-end verifiable voting system that uses randomized candidate orders and cryptographic techniques to allow voters to confirm their vote was counted correctly without revealing how they voted.

All labels observed (1)

Label Occurrences
Prêt à Voter canonical 3

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (50)

Predicate Object
instanceOf cryptographic voting protocol ⓘ
end-to-end verifiable voting system ⓘ
aimsTo allow voters to verify their vote is included in the tally ⓘ
prevent voters from proving how they voted ⓘ
provide individual verifiability for each voter ⓘ
provide universal verifiability of the election outcome ⓘ
comparedTo Helios voting system ⓘ
Punchscan ⓘ
Scantegrity ⓘ
developedBy Peter Ryan ⓘ
collaborators in the electronic voting research community ⓘ
field applied cryptography ⓘ
computer security ⓘ
electronic voting ⓘ
hasComponent ballot form with randomized candidate list ⓘ
encrypted receipt ⓘ
mixing and decryption phase ⓘ
public bulletin board ⓘ
separate strip for marking the vote ⓘ
hasDocumentation academic research papers ⓘ
hasPrimaryFeature end-to-end verifiability ⓘ
randomized candidate order on each ballot ⓘ
receipt-freeness goal ⓘ
voter-verifiable paper audit trail ⓘ
hasProperty ballot secrecy is preserved under standard assumptions ⓘ
supports risk-limiting audits in some variants ⓘ
tally can be recomputed and verified by observers ⓘ
voter can check presence of their encrypted vote on a public bulletin board ⓘ
hasSecurityGoal coercion resistance ⓘ
public verifiability of decryption and mixing ⓘ
robustness against ballot stuffing ⓘ
robustness against vote manipulation ⓘ
hasUseCase governmental elections (pilot trials) ⓘ
organizational and academic elections ⓘ
hasVariant Prêt à Voter with homomorphic tallying ⓘ
Prêt à Voter with re-encryption mix-nets ⓘ
inspired later end-to-end verifiable voting schemes ⓘ
introducedIn early 2000s ⓘ
isDiscussedIn literature on verifiable elections and e-voting standards ⓘ
nameLanguage French ⓘ
nameMeaning ready to vote ⓘ
requires procedures for generating and auditing randomized ballots ⓘ
trusted setup for cryptographic keys ⓘ
securityDependsOn correct implementation of mix-nets and proofs ⓘ
integrity of the public bulletin board ⓘ
uses cryptographic commitments ⓘ
mix-nets ⓘ
public-key cryptography ⓘ
randomized candidate permutations ⓘ
zero-knowledge proofs ⓘ

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (3)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

ThreeBallot voting system → relatedTo → Prêt à Voter ⓘ
Scantegrity → relatedTo → Prêt à Voter ⓘ
Punchscan → comparedTo → Prêt à Voter ⓘ