Grelling–Nelson paradox

E357180

The Grelling–Nelson paradox is a self-referential logical paradox arising from classifying adjectives as "autological" or "heterological," leading to a contradiction when considering whether "heterological" describes itself.

All labels observed (2)

Label Occurrences
Grelling–Nelson paradox canonical 2
Grelling paradox 1

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (47)

Predicate Object
instanceOf logical paradox ⓘ
self-referential paradox ⓘ
semantic paradox ⓘ
alsoKnownAs Grelling paradox ⓘ
assumes every adjective is either autological or heterological ⓘ
no adjective is both autological and heterological ⓘ
basedOn natural language semantics ⓘ
set-theoretic comprehension ⓘ
category paradoxes of self-reference ⓘ
philosophical logic ⓘ
concerns adjectives that describe themselves ⓘ
adjectives that do not describe themselves ⓘ
describes classification of adjectives ⓘ
exposes limits of naive classification in natural language ⓘ
self-referential inconsistency ⓘ
field logic ⓘ
philosophy of language ⓘ
set theory ⓘ
formalization set of all heterological adjectives ⓘ
hasComponent definition of autological adjective ⓘ
definition of heterological adjective ⓘ
illustrates problems with naive set formation ⓘ
self-referential paradoxes in ordinary language ⓘ
influenced development of formal semantics ⓘ
later work on semantic paradoxes ⓘ
involvesQuestion whether the adjective "heterological" is autological ⓘ
whether the adjective "heterological" is heterological ⓘ
language German ⓘ
leadsTo logical contradiction ⓘ
motivated hierarchies of languages ⓘ
restrictions on semantic predicates ⓘ
type-theoretic solutions ⓘ
namedAfter Kurt Grelling ⓘ
Leonard Nelson ⓘ
problemType vagueness and self-application in predicates ⓘ
relatedConcept Tarski undefinability theorem ⓘ
semantic hierarchy ⓘ
truth predicate ⓘ
relatedTo Berry paradox ⓘ
Russell paradox ⓘ
linked to: Russell’s paradox

liar paradox ⓘ
semantic paradox ⓘ
timePeriod early 20th century ⓘ
usesConcept autological adjective ⓘ
heterological adjective ⓘ
liar paradox ⓘ
self-reference ⓘ

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (3)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Epimenides paradox → relatedTo → Grelling–Nelson paradox ⓘ
Berry paradox → relatedTo → Grelling–Nelson paradox ⓘ
Grelling–Nelson paradox → alsoKnownAs → Grelling paradox ⓘ
linked to: Grelling–Nelson paradox