Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy

E266786

"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.

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Statements (43)

Predicate Object
instanceOf academic paper ⓘ
economics paper ⓘ
macroeconomics paper ⓘ
monetary economics paper ⓘ
aimsTo compare outcomes under rules and discretion ⓘ
understand how credibility affects inflation and output ⓘ
analyzes effects of different monetary policy regimes ⓘ
inflation outcomes under rules and discretion ⓘ
output outcomes under rules and discretion ⓘ
role of policymaker credibility ⓘ
author David B. Gordon ⓘ
Robert J. Barro ⓘ
concludes discretionary policy can lead to higher inflation without higher output ⓘ
reputation can partially substitute for formal rules ⓘ
contribution explanation of inflationary bias under discretion ⓘ
formalization of reputation effects in monetary policy ⓘ
framework for analyzing credibility and policy outcomes ⓘ
field dynamic inconsistency ⓘ
game theory ⓘ
inflation ⓘ
macroeconomics ⓘ
monetary policy ⓘ
time inconsistency ⓘ
hasConcept discretionary policy ⓘ
inflation expectations ⓘ
output gap ⓘ
policy rule ⓘ
reputational equilibrium ⓘ
influenced debate on rules versus discretion in central banking ⓘ
literature on time inconsistency in monetary policy ⓘ
research on central bank credibility ⓘ
language English ⓘ
relatedTo Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy ⓘ
Kydland and Prescott’s work on rules rather than discretion ⓘ
status influential paper in monetary economics ⓘ
topic credibility of monetary authorities ⓘ
inflation and output trade-off ⓘ
inflation bias ⓘ
optimal monetary policy ⓘ
reputation in monetary policy ⓘ
rules versus discretion in monetary policy ⓘ
uses dynamic game framework ⓘ
rational expectations ⓘ

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Referenced by (2)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Jordi Galí → hasNotableWork → Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy ⓘ
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy → relatedTo → Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy ⓘ
linked to: Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy