Gödel–Schmidt example

E949471

The Gödel–Schmidt example is a thought experiment from Saul Kripke’s *Naming and Necessity* used to illustrate issues about reference, proper names, and the distinction between sense and reference in the philosophy of language.

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Label Occurrences
Gödel–Schmidt example canonical 1

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Statements (46)

Predicate Object
instanceOf Kripkean thought experiment ⓘ
example in philosophy of language ⓘ
philosophical thought experiment ⓘ
appearsIn Naming and Necessity ⓘ
associatedWith Kripke’s critique of Frege–Russell descriptivism ⓘ
direct reference theory ⓘ
citedBy commentaries on Kripke’s Naming and Necessity ⓘ
literature on direct reference ⓘ
literature on semantic externalism ⓘ
contrastsWith Fregean sense-reference theory ⓘ
Russellian descriptivism about names ⓘ
hasAuthor Saul Kripke ⓘ
hasContext 20th-century philosophy of language ⓘ
analytic philosophy ⓘ
hasKeyClaim reference of a proper name is not determined by a descriptive condition known by the speaker ⓘ
speakers can successfully refer even when their associated descriptions are false ⓘ
the name ‘Gödel’ would still refer to Gödel even if Schmidt had proved the incompleteness theorems ⓘ
hasPurpose to challenge descriptivist accounts of proper names ⓘ
to separate epistemic access from semantic reference ⓘ
to support a causal theory of reference ⓘ
illustrates distinction between sense and reference ⓘ
epistemic versus metaphysical necessity ⓘ
issues about reference ⓘ
problems for descriptivist theories of names ⓘ
rigid designation ⓘ
use of proper names ⓘ
involvesCharacter Kurt Gödel ⓘ
Schmidt ⓘ
involvesConcept Millian theory of names ⓘ
causal-historical chain of reference ⓘ
descriptivist theory of names ⓘ
misattributed description ⓘ
reference fixing ⓘ
semantic externalism ⓘ
language English ⓘ
namedAfter Kurt Gödel ⓘ
Schmidt (fictional or hypothetical mathematician) ⓘ
linked to: Schmidt
supportsView names are rigid designators ⓘ
semantic content of a name is its bearer ⓘ
taughtIn graduate seminars on reference and modality ⓘ
introductory philosophy of language courses ⓘ
usedIn Kripkean semantics ⓘ
linked to: Kripke semantics

causal theory of reference ⓘ
metaphysics of reference ⓘ
philosophy of language ⓘ
theory of proper names ⓘ

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Referenced by (1)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Naming and Necessity → hasExample → Gödel–Schmidt example ⓘ