On Incentives and Control in Organizations
E680265
"On Incentives and Control in Organizations" is an influential doctoral thesis in economics that develops foundational theories on how incentive structures and control mechanisms shape behavior and performance within firms.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| On Incentives and Control in Organizations canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T7651518 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: On Incentives and Control in Organizations Context triple: [Bengt Holmström, doctoralThesis, On Incentives and Control in Organizations]
-
A.
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
-
B.
"The Nature of the Firm"
"The Nature of the Firm" is a foundational 1937 economic essay by Ronald Coase that explains why firms exist and how transaction costs shape their size and structure.
-
C.
Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control
"Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control" is an early 20th-century investigative study by the U.S. Bureau of Corporations analyzing how financial structures and ownership patterns influence corporate power and control.
-
D.
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations is a foundational organizational theory book that explores how limited information, conflicting goals, and uncertainty shape decision-making processes within organizations.
-
E.
Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond
"Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond" is a scholarly work by Oliver E. Williamson that surveys and extends key developments in organizational theory from Barnard’s foundational ideas to contemporary perspectives.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: On Incentives and Control in Organizations Target entity description: "On Incentives and Control in Organizations" is an influential doctoral thesis in economics that develops foundational theories on how incentive structures and control mechanisms shape behavior and performance within firms.
-
A.
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
-
B.
"The Nature of the Firm"
"The Nature of the Firm" is a foundational 1937 economic essay by Ronald Coase that explains why firms exist and how transaction costs shape their size and structure.
-
C.
Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control
"Reports on the relation of corporate finance to control" is an early 20th-century investigative study by the U.S. Bureau of Corporations analyzing how financial structures and ownership patterns influence corporate power and control.
-
D.
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations
Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations is a foundational organizational theory book that explores how limited information, conflicting goals, and uncertainty shape decision-making processes within organizations.
-
E.
Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond
"Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond" is a scholarly work by Oliver E. Williamson that surveys and extends key developments in organizational theory from Barnard’s foundational ideas to contemporary perspectives.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (47)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic work
ⓘ
doctoral thesis ⓘ economics dissertation ⓘ |
| analyzes |
delegation of decision rights in firms
ⓘ
how incentive schemes affect employee effort ⓘ optimal design of contracts within organizations ⓘ trade‑offs between risk sharing and incentives ⓘ |
| contributesTo |
formal modeling of organizational behavior
ⓘ
foundations of organizational economics ⓘ theory of incentives in firms ⓘ understanding of control systems in organizations ⓘ |
| describes |
conditions for efficient internal organization of firms
ⓘ
effects of monitoring on effort and shirking ⓘ relationship between control intensity and agent autonomy ⓘ role of performance measurement in incentive contracts ⓘ |
| documentType | PhD thesis ⓘ |
| examines |
allocation of authority within firms
ⓘ
costs and benefits of monitoring in firms ⓘ how control systems mitigate agency problems ⓘ interaction between incentives and organizational structure ⓘ multi‑task incentive problems in organizations ⓘ |
| field |
contract theory
ⓘ
economics ⓘ organizational economics ⓘ theory of the firm ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
behavior of agents within firms
ⓘ
control mechanisms in organizations ⓘ incentive structures in firms ⓘ information asymmetry in firms ⓘ monitoring and control systems ⓘ moral hazard in organizations ⓘ organizational design ⓘ performance within organizations ⓘ principal–agent relationships ⓘ |
| hasConcept |
control rights in firms
ⓘ
incentive compatibility in organizations ⓘ monitoring technology and effort choice ⓘ organizational control systems ⓘ performance‑based compensation ⓘ |
| influenced |
later research on organizational design
ⓘ
studies of corporate governance mechanisms ⓘ subsequent work in contract theory ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| proposes |
formal models of incentive contracts
ⓘ
frameworks for designing control mechanisms ⓘ |
| recognizedAs |
foundational contribution to incentive theory in firms
ⓘ
influential work in organizational economics ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
The pipeline generated the facts above by prompting gpt-5.1 with this entity's name + description and the instruction below.
Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: On Incentives and Control in Organizations Description of subject: "On Incentives and Control in Organizations" is an influential doctoral thesis in economics that develops foundational theories on how incentive structures and control mechanisms shape behavior and performance within firms.
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
subject linked to:
Bengt Holmström (studies, later MIT)