Shapley–Gale theorem

E612745

The Shapley–Gale theorem is a foundational result in cooperative game theory that characterizes stable outcomes in assignment and matching problems, underpinning much of modern market design and matching theory.

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Shapley–Gale theorem canonical 1

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Statements (25)

Predicate Object
instanceOf result in cooperative game theory ⓘ
theorem ⓘ
appliesTo assignment games ⓘ
two-sided matching markets ⓘ
assumption transferable utility in assignment games ⓘ
characterizes stable matchings ⓘ
concerns assignment problems ⓘ
matching problems ⓘ
stable outcomes ⓘ
coreIdea stable outcomes correspond to core allocations in assignment games ⓘ
field cooperative game theory ⓘ
market design ⓘ
matching theory ⓘ
framework cooperative games with transferable utility ⓘ
guarantees existence of stable outcomes in certain matching models ⓘ
influenced design of matching mechanisms ⓘ
theory of stable matchings ⓘ
namedAfter David Gale ⓘ
Lloyd Shapley ⓘ
provides characterization of the core in assignment games ⓘ
relatedTo Gale–Shapley algorithm ⓘ
Shapley–Shubik assignment game ⓘ
usedFor analysis of matching markets with monetary transfers ⓘ
usedIn matching theory ⓘ
modern market design ⓘ

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Referenced by (1)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

David Gale → notableWork → Shapley–Gale theorem ⓘ