Democracy in Deficit

E438124

Democracy in Deficit is a seminal public choice economics book by James M. Buchanan and Richard Wagner that critiques Keynesian fiscal policy and explains how democratic political incentives lead to chronic government budget deficits.

All labels observed (1)

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Democracy in Deficit canonical 3

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Statements (50)

Predicate Object
instanceOf book ⓘ
economics book ⓘ
non-fiction book ⓘ
public choice economics book ⓘ
aimsTo explain chronic budget deficits in democracies ⓘ
link political processes to fiscal outcomes ⓘ
author James M. Buchanan ⓘ
Richard E. Wagner ⓘ
coAuthor James M. Buchanan ⓘ
Richard E. Wagner ⓘ
countryOfOrigin United States ⓘ
criticizes Keynesian economics ⓘ
Keynesian fiscal policy ⓘ
deficit financing ⓘ
discretionary fiscal policy ⓘ
short-run demand management ⓘ
field economics ⓘ
political economy ⓘ
public choice theory ⓘ
genre academic literature ⓘ
hasKeyConcept constitutional constraints ⓘ
fiscal illusion ⓘ
intergenerational redistribution via debt ⓘ
political incentives ⓘ
rules versus discretion in policy ⓘ
hasPerspective public choice perspective ⓘ
influenced constitutional fiscal reforms ⓘ
literature on political budget cycles ⓘ
research on deficit bias ⓘ
influencedBy Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics ⓘ
constitutional economics ⓘ
public choice theory ⓘ
language English ⓘ
mainSubject Keynesian fiscal policy ⓘ
constitutional political economy ⓘ
democratic political incentives ⓘ
fiscal policy ⓘ
government budget deficits ⓘ
public debt ⓘ
notableFor analysis of democratic bias toward deficits ⓘ
public choice critique of Keynesianism ⓘ
proposes constitutional constraints on fiscal policy ⓘ
fiscal rules ⓘ
publicationYear 1977 ⓘ
publisher Academic Press ⓘ
relatedWork Public Finance in Democratic Process ⓘ
The Calculus of Consent ⓘ
theorizes political incentives for overspending ⓘ
systematic deficit bias in democracies ⓘ
time inconsistency in fiscal policy ⓘ

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Referenced by (3)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

James M. Buchanan → notableWork → Democracy in Deficit ⓘ
James M. Buchanan → notableWork → Democracy in Deficit ⓘ
subject linked to: James McGill Buchanan Jr.
Richard E. Wagner → notableWork → Democracy in Deficit ⓘ