Moore's paradox

E143658

Moore's paradox is a philosophical problem highlighting the oddity of asserting a sentence like "It is raining, but I don't believe that it is raining," which seems logically consistent yet pragmatically absurd.

All labels observed (1)

Label Occurrences
Moore's paradox canonical 1

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (48)

Predicate Object
instanceOf epistemological problem ⓘ
philosophical paradox ⓘ
appearsIn G. E. Moore's papers on certainty and belief ⓘ
concerns apparent inconsistency between content and use of assertions ⓘ
pragmatic absurdity of certain statements ⓘ
rationality of belief and assertion ⓘ
relationship between belief and assertion norms ⓘ
self-knowledge of one’s own beliefs ⓘ
describes oddity of certain first-person assertions ⓘ
distinguishedFrom Liar paradox ⓘ
logical contradiction ⓘ
example "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining" ⓘ
"p and I believe that not-p" ⓘ
"p and I do not believe that p" ⓘ
field epistemology ⓘ
philosophy of language ⓘ
hasComponent propositional content p ⓘ
speaker’s belief state about p ⓘ
hasForm "p and I believe that not-p" ⓘ
"p and I do not believe that p" ⓘ
implies speaker is irrational if statement is true ⓘ
speaker violates norms of assertion ⓘ
speaker violates norms of rational belief ⓘ
involves first-person authority over mental states ⓘ
first-person present-tense belief ascriptions ⓘ
self-referential belief reports ⓘ
tension between belief and assertion ⓘ
transparency of belief to truth ⓘ
logicalStatus logically consistent ⓘ
namedAfter G. E. Moore ⓘ
pragmaticStatus pragmatically absurd ⓘ
raisesQuestion how belief is connected to sincere assertion ⓘ
how to model belief in formal epistemology ⓘ
what norms govern assertion ⓘ
whether one can be mistaken about one’s own beliefs ⓘ
relatedTo belief norm of assertion ⓘ
knowledge norm of assertion ⓘ
logical consistency ⓘ
pragmatic inconsistency ⓘ
pragmatics of language ⓘ
self-knowledge ⓘ
self-referential paradoxes ⓘ
speech act theory ⓘ
the norm of assertion ⓘ
studiedBy G. E. Moore ⓘ
Ludwig Wittgenstein ⓘ
contemporary analytic philosophers ⓘ
timePeriod 20th-century analytic philosophy ⓘ

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (1)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

G. E. Moore → notableIdea → Moore's paradox ⓘ