open-question argument

E143657

The open-question argument is G. E. Moore’s influential philosophical critique of ethical naturalism, claiming that no proposed naturalistic definition of “good” can capture its meaning because it always remains an intelligible open question whether that definition is truly good.

All labels observed (2)

Label Occurrences
Natural Questions 1
open-question argument canonical 1

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (48)

Predicate Object
instanceOf argument against ethical naturalism ⓘ
metaethical argument ⓘ
philosophical argument ⓘ
associatedWith Moorean intuitionism ⓘ
linked to: intuitionism

non-natural property of goodness ⓘ
author G. E. Moore ⓘ
conclusion good is not analytically equivalent to any natural property ⓘ
no naturalistic definition of good is adequate ⓘ
criticizedBy A. J. Ayer ⓘ
C. L. Stevenson ⓘ
Cornell realists ⓘ
Frank Jackson ⓘ
linked to: David Lewis

R. M. Hare ⓘ
Richard Boyd ⓘ
conceptual role semantics theorists ⓘ
field analytic philosophy ⓘ
ethics ⓘ
metaethics ⓘ
historicalPeriod early 20th century ⓘ
implication ethical naturalism fails as a theory of moral meaning ⓘ
good is a simple, indefinable property ⓘ
moral properties are sui generis ⓘ
influenced 20th-century analytic ethics ⓘ
intuitionism in ethics ⓘ
non-naturalist moral realism ⓘ
keyClaim for any proposed naturalistic definition of good, it remains an open question whether that thing is good ⓘ
meaning of good cannot be reduced to any natural property term ⓘ
the question whether a proposed naturalistic property is good is not trivial or tautological ⓘ
language English ⓘ
mainWork Principia Ethica ⓘ
method conceptual analysis of moral terms ⓘ
opposesView good is identical to any single natural property ⓘ
good is identical to pleasure ⓘ
good is identical to what promotes survival ⓘ
good is identical to what we desire to desire ⓘ
premise if two terms are analytically equivalent, the question of their identity is trivial ⓘ
questions about the goodness of any natural property are substantive, not trivial ⓘ
publicationYear 1903 ⓘ
relatedConcept naturalistic fallacy ⓘ
reliesOn distinction between analytic and synthetic truths ⓘ
ordinary language intuitions about moral terms ⓘ
supports moral non-naturalism ⓘ
moral realism (non-naturalist) ⓘ
targets ethical naturalism ⓘ
naturalistic definitions of good ⓘ
usedInDebate debates about the analytic-synthetic distinction in ethics ⓘ
debates over moral naturalism vs non-naturalism ⓘ
debates over moral reductionism ⓘ

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (2)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

G. E. Moore → notableIdea → open-question argument ⓘ
Seneca the Younger → notableWork → Natural Questions ⓘ
linked to: open-question argument