Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources

E137815

"Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources" is a scholarly work that uses game theory and institutional analysis to explain how communities can successfully self-govern shared resources without relying solely on markets or centralized authorities.

All labels observed (1)

Label Occurrences
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources canonical 2

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Statements (45)

Predicate Object
instanceOf book ⓘ
non-fiction book ⓘ
scholarly work ⓘ
appliesTheory institutional analysis and development framework ⓘ
non-cooperative game theory ⓘ
arguesThat communities can self-govern common-pool resources ⓘ
effective local rules can prevent overuse of shared resources ⓘ
markets and central authorities are not the only governance solutions ⓘ
author Elinor Ostrom ⓘ
James Walker ⓘ
Roy Gardner ⓘ
contribution bridges experimental game theory and field research on commons ⓘ
offers empirical evidence of successful self-governance of CPRs ⓘ
provides systematic framework for analyzing rules in use ⓘ
critiques simple tragedy of the commons models ⓘ
demonstrates effects of monitoring and sanctioning rules ⓘ
importance of rule configurations for outcomes in commons dilemmas ⓘ
role of communication among resource users ⓘ
field environmental governance ⓘ
institutional economics ⓘ
political economy ⓘ
public policy ⓘ
focusesOn design of rules for shared resources ⓘ
experimental games ⓘ
field studies of resource users ⓘ
self-organization of communities ⓘ
hasConcept appropriation dilemmas ⓘ
collective-choice rules ⓘ
constitutional rules ⓘ
design of institutions for CPRs ⓘ
nested enterprises in governance ⓘ
operational rules ⓘ
provision dilemmas ⓘ
intendedAudience graduate students ⓘ
policy analysts ⓘ
researchers ⓘ
language English ⓘ
mainSubject collective action ⓘ
common-pool resources ⓘ
game theory ⓘ
governance of the commons ⓘ
institutional analysis ⓘ
resource management ⓘ
self-governance ⓘ
relatedTo Governing the Commons ⓘ

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (2)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Elinor Ostrom → notableWork → Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources ⓘ
James Walker → coauthorOf → Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources ⓘ